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INTRODUCTION
Sherry Johnson was just ten years old when she was raped and
impregnated by her conservative Apostolic church’s twenty-year-old
deacon.1 After child welfare authorities began investigating her
case, Sherry’s family and church officials forced her to marry her
rapist to avoid a “messy criminal case.”2 By the time Sherry turned
eleven years old, not only had she been sexually abused, but her
own family forced her to marry her abuser.3 What is perhaps most
shocking about this case, is that Sherry’s story took place right here
in the Unites States.4 After a judge in Tampa, Florida, refused to
marry Sherry to the adult man, Sherry’s family took her to nearby
Pinellas County where the judge issued a marriage license with full
knowledge that Sherry was just eleven years old.5
Sherry’s story is not an anomaly in the United States. The United
Nations defines “child marriage” as marriage involving at least one
party “under the age of eighteen.”6 Although child marriage is
perceived as an issue only affecting developing countries, between
2000 and 2015, an alarming 200,000 children married in the United
States.7 Further, 87 percent of the children married were girls, and
1. Moni Basu, Sherry Johnson Was Raped, Pregnant and Married by 11. Now She’s
Fighting to End Child Marriage in America, CNN (Jan. 31, 2018, 11:48 PM), https://www.-
cnn.com/2018/01/29/health/ending-child-marriage-in-america/index.html [https://perma.cc/-
GH6T-CW36]; Nicholas Kristof, Opinion, 11 Years Old, a Mom, and Pushed to Marry Her
Rapist in Florida, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 2017/05/26/opinion/-
sunday/it-was-forced-on-me-child-marriage-in-the-us.html [https://perma.cc/TQ43-7QG9].
2. Kristof, supra note 1.
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. Basu, supra note 1.
6. See Camellia Burris, Comment, Why Domestic Institutions Are Failing Child Brides:
A Comparative Analysis of India’s and the United States’ Legal Approaches to the Institution
of Child Marriage, 23 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 151, 152 (2014) (citing ANJU MALHOTRA ET AL.,
INT’L CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON WOMEN, SOLUTIONS TO END CHILD MARRIAGE 2, http://www.-
icrw.org/files/publications/Solutions-to-End-Child-Marriage.pdf).
7. TAHIRIH JUSTICE CTR., CHILD MARRIAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: A SERIOUS PROBLEM
WITH A SIMPLE FIRST-STEP SOLUTION (2017) (footnotes omitted), http://www.tahirih.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/11/Tahirih-Child-Marriage-Backgrounder-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/AN2Z-
C83V].
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86 percent of the young girls8 married adult men.9 According to a
2011 research report, it is estimated that “over 9.4 million U.S. wo-
men had married at age 16 or younger and that nearly 1.7 million
had married at age 15 or younger.”10 Additionally, a 2016 Pew Re-
search Center report found that “[a]bout 57,800 minors in the U.S.
ages 15 to 17 were married as of 2014.”11
These statistics are particularly alarming, given that early mar-
riage often leads to young children experiencing devastating, life-
long consequences such as marital instability,12 decreased likelihood
of continuing formal education,13 increased likelihood of future pov-
erty,14 and increased susceptibility to mental15 and physical health
issues.16
One might wonder how children in the United States are mar-
rying at such alarming rates, despite statutory laws regulating
marriage and early child marriage’s well-documented negative
consequences. Although almost every state mandates eighteen as
8. Of young girls who were married, 67 percent were seventeen years old, 29 percent
were sixteen years old, and 5 percent were fifteen years old or younger. Anjali Tsui, Dan
Nolan & Chris Amico, Child Marriage in America: By the Numbers, PBS FRONTLINE (July
6, 2017), http://apps.frontline.org/child-marriage-by-the-numbers/ [https://perma.cc/99ST-
FLRE]. Of adult men married to young girls, 60 percent were eighteen to twenty years old,
25 percent were twenty-one to twenty-three years old, 9 percent were twenty-four to twenty-
six years old, and 6 percent twenty-seven years old or older. Id.
9. Id.
10. Tahirih Responds to Pew Report on Child Marriage in the U.S., TAHIRIH JUST. CTR.
(Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.tahirih.org/news/tahirih-responds-to-pew-report-on-child-mar-
riage-in-the-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/8JGA-P7X7].
11. David McClendon & Aleksandra Sandstrom, Child Marriage Is Rare in the U.S.,
Though This Varies by State, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 1, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2016/11/01/child-marriage-is-rare-in-the-u-s-though-this-varies-by-state/ [https://perma.-
cc/E7XH-AN9M]. 
12. See INST. FOR AM. VALUES & NAT’L MARRIAGE PROJECT, THE STATE OF OUR UNIONS:
WHEN MARRIAGE DISAPPEARS 73 (W. Bradford Wilcox et al. eds., 2010), http://-
nationalmarriageproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Union_11_12_10.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FB79-9ZSW] (noting that delaying marriage until after the age of 25 reduces
the risk of divorce by 24 percent). 
13. See Gordon B. Dahl, Early Teen Marriage and Future Poverty, 47 DEMOGRAPHY 689,
691 (2010).
14. Id. at 711.
15. See Yann Le Strat, Caroline Dubertret & Bernard Le Foll, Child Marriage in the
United States and Its Association with Mental Health in Women, 128 PEDIATRICS 524, 527
(2011).
16. See MALHOTRA ET AL., supra note 6, at 4.
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the age of marital consent,17 forty-eight states have statutory ex-
ceptions authorizing early child marriage.18 Further, because state
legislatures have the discretion to make child marriage laws, stat-
utory laws vary significantly from state to state.19
This Note will discuss the variations in state child marriage laws
and argue that such variations create loopholes that increase the
vulnerability of children, especially young girls, to coercive and forc-
ed marriages. Further, this Note will argue that state statutes do
not adequately address the issue of child marriage in the United
States, and thus federal action is necessary. Specifically, Congress
should use its spending power to condition 10 percent of federal edu-
cation funding on states’ enactment of uniform child marriage laws:
eighteen as the minimum age of marriageability without exception. 
Part I will discuss child marriage’s history and evolution in the
United States. Part II will examine current child marriage laws in
the United States and discuss the variations in state child marriage
laws. Part III will discuss child marriage’s negative consequences,
and its broader effects on society at large. Part IV will argue that
state regulation is insufficient to prevent child marriage. Part V
will discuss Congress’s spending power under South Dakota v. Dole
and argue that Congress should use its spending power to incentiv-
ize states to enact standardized child marriage regulations. Finally,
Part VI will argue that the congressional taxing power would not
effectively prevent child marriage, and that the spending power is
a more effective tool to address this issue. In sum, this Note demon-
strates that state child marriage laws have proven insufficient to
protect vulnerable youth in the United States, and federal reform is
necessary to ensure the protection of children and vitality of future
generations.
17. See Erin K. Jackson, Addressing the Inconsistency Between Statutory Rape Laws and
Underage Marriage: Abolishing Early Marriage and Removing the Spousal Exemption to Stat-
utory Rape, 85 UMKC L. REV. 343, 354 (2017). 
18. See Lynn D. Wardle, Rethinking Marital Age Restrictions, 22 J. FAM. L. 1, 11-12 (1983).
In 2018, Delaware became the first state to ban marriage under the age of eighteen without
exceptions. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 123 (2018). New Jersey followed shortly thereafter. N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 37:1-6 (West 2018).
19. See Jackson, supra note 17, at 351. 
2342 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:2337
I. HISTORY OF CHILD MARRIAGE IN THE UNITED STATES
Child marriage in the United States predates the American
Revolution, and it has survived all the way to modern times despite
significant transformation.20 This Part provides a brief overview of
child marriage laws’s evolution in the United States. Next, this Part
will discuss the child marriage laws that the Colonies adopted and
how the laws developed and modernized over time.
A. Child Marriage Under the English Common Law
Child marriage is a practice that is deeply rooted in U.S. history,
dating back to English common law.21 English common law permit-
ted some minors to marry, and the law divided children into three
groups to determine the legality of marriage: (1) children under the
age of seven; (2) children between seven and the “age of discre-
tion”—fourteen for boys and twelve for girls; and (3) children who
reached the age of discretion.22 First, English common law consid-
ered children under the age of seven incapable of consenting to
marriage, and it considered marriages before seven completely
void.23 Second, children between seven and the age of discretion
could lawfully marry, but the marriage was “imperfect.”24 Although
English common law considered imperfect marriages valid, either
party could void the marriage at-will until both parties reached the
age of discretion.25 Finally, English common law considered mar-
riages after the child reached the age of discretion presumptively
valid.26
Initially, marriage under English common law did not require
parental consent; however, in 1753 Parliament enacted Lord
Hardwicke’s Act which required the minor’s father’s consent to
legally marry; minors were all children under the age of twenty-
20. See id. at 349, 351.
21. See Wardle, supra note 18, at 5-7.
22. Id. at 5-6; see also Jackson, supra note 17, at 347-48. 
23. Wardle, supra note 18, at 5-6.
24. Id. at 6.
25. Id. 
26. Id. 
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one.27 Hardwicke’s Act “reinforced the centrality of marriage as the
institution through which families controlled property and
wealth.”28 Thus, Hardwicke’s Act allowed families to use marriage
as a method to enter into alliances that would produce future heirs
to inherit family property.29
Coverture was another important doctrine under English common
law. Coverture held that a husband and wife became one person at
marriage and thus the wife’s legal existence consolidated into her
husband’s legal existence.30 Therefore, anything a woman earned
belonged to her husband: she could not enter a contract, she could
not sue her husband, and she was obligated to serve her husband.31
Further, a woman could not bring rape charges against her hus-
band because English common law presumed ongoing sexual
consent between husbands and wives.32 In turn, the husband was
obligated to provide financial support to his wife and children.33
B. Child Marriage Laws and the American Colonies 
Colonial America adopted the English common law view of child
marriage; however, Hardwicke’s Act did not have a strong influence
on American child marriage laws.34 It was not until the colonies be-
gan enacting their own statutes to regulate child marriage that the
parental consent requirement became prominent in United States
marriage laws.35
In the early 1600s, colonial legislatures began passing their own
laws to govern marriage in the United States.36 The Colonies’
27. Id. at 7. Lord Hardwicke’s Act rendered void all marriages entered by parties under
the age of twenty-one and without parental consent. Id. If a minor’s father was deceased, then
marriage required the consent of the child’s mother or guardian. Id.
28. Vivian E. Hamilton, The Age of Marital Capacity: Reconsidering Civil Recognition of
Adolescent Marriage, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1817, 1827 (2012).
29. Id. 
30. See NICHOLAS L. SYRETT, AMERICAN CHILD BRIDE: A HISTORY OF MINORS AND MAR-




34. See Jackson, supra note 17, at 349. 
35. See SYRETT, supra note 30, at 19. 
36. See Hamilton, supra note 28, at 1828-29; Jackson, supra note 17, at 349; Wardle,
supra note 18, at 7.
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marriage codes often mirrored English common law, including par-
ental consent requirements that prevented “clandestine” child
marriages.37 Plymouth Bay passed a statute in 1636 stating that
“none be allowed to marry that are under the covert of parent but by
their consent and approbation.”38 In 1650, Connecticut passed a
similar statute that prohibited child marriage without a parent’s or
guardian’s permission.39 These statutes exemplify the colonial mar-
riage laws’s trend to focus on regulating child marriage in order to
preserve the parent’s right to control the child for economic reasons
rather than regulating to preserve children’s youth and promote
their well-being.40
Finally, all colonies adopted English common law’s age of legal
majority—twenty-one—as the age at which individuals could marry
without parental consent; however, courts continued to uphold mar-
riages for individuals who met the English common law age of pre-
sumptive consent—fourteen for boys and twelve for girls—because
the Colonies did not “explicitly repudiate” the common law.41
C. Child Marriage Laws and Early States
After the American Revolution, many states modified their mar-
riage laws, and the modifications varied based on region.42 For ex-
ample, northern states placed more emphasis on parental consent,43
whereas southern states focused on the parent’s ability to regulate
property through marriage.44 In the 1850s, new states forming in
the West and Midwest were much more likely to set age minimums
37. See Hamilton, supra note 28, at 1828. 
38. SYRETT, supra note 30, at 23. 
39. Id. at 24. 
40. Id. at 16. 
41. See Hamilton, supra note 28, at 1829. 
42. See SYRETT, supra note 30, at 27. 
43. Maryland enacted a law in 1777 mandating that girls below the age of sixteen, and
boys below the age of twenty-one, receive parental consent to marry. See id. Similarly,
Massachusetts and Delaware mandated that girls below the age of eighteen, and boys below
the age of twenty-one, receive parental consent to marry. See id.
44. See, e.g., id. at 30 (“South Carolina remained intent on punishing men who married
underage girls for their fortunes.”). Virginia also enacted a law regulating property control
through marriage, mandating that “any girl between the ages of twelve and sixteen who
married without parental or guardian permission forfeited her inheritance to her next of
kin.” Id. at 26.
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while still allowing marriage below the minimum age with parental
consent.45
Despite geographical variation, early marriage laws in the United
States typically included four components: (1) the age at which in-
dividual consent is sufficient to marry, (2) the age at which an indi-
vidual can marry with parental consent, (3) the description of
“exceptional circumstances in which one can marry below the mini-
mum age of parental permission,” and (4) “regulations establishing
the earliest age of marriageability.”46
During the mid-nineteenth century, the United States underwent
a significant transformation in its views of childhood and marriage.
This reform was known as the Social Purity Movement, and re-
formers began campaigning to raise the age of marital consent and
sexual consent.47 During this era, society began to view children as
innocents needing protection, and childhood was understood as
clearly distinct and markedly different from adulthood.48 In
response to the Social Purity Movement, twenty-two states and
Washington, D.C. either instituted minimum age requirements for
marriage or raised existing minimum age requirements.49
At the end of the twentieth century, most states had enacted
statutes that superseded the English common law and raised mar-
ital age requirements.50 Further, from the late nineteenth century
to mid-twentieth century, the majority of states set the minimum
age of marital consent at eighteen for girls and twenty-one for
boys.51
45. See, e.g., id. at 30 (noting that Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois adopted fourteen and
seventeen as the minimum marriageable age for girls and boys respectively, and Minnesota,
Michigan, Kansas, Oregon, Nevada, and Missouri similarly adopted minimum age require-
ments for child marriage). Early marriage was very common in the West and Midwest because
men often outnumbered women in these regions, necessitating earlier ages of marriageability.
See id. at 65; see also Hamilton, supra note 28, at 1834. 
46. See Jackson, supra note 17, at 349. 
47. See Hamilton, supra note 28, at 1830. 
48. See SYRETT, supra note 30, at 124. Modern statutory rape laws criminalizing sex
between minors and adults also arose from this era. Id. 
49. Id. at 130. 
50. See Hamilton, supra note 28, at 1830-31.
51. See SYRETT, supra note 30, at 134-35 tbl.5.1 (listing states’ statutory age of marital
consent for 1865 and 1920). 
2346 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:2337
D. Modern Child Marriage Laws
After Congress lowered the draft age from twenty-one to eigh-
teen during World War II, Americans began questioning the valid-
ity of laws that restricted legal rights of individuals between the
ages of eighteen and twenty-one.52 This sentiment extended into the
Vietnam War, as the government drafted many young men who felt
they should be extended the full rights of citizenship.53
Further, prior to 1971, the majority of states set the age of
marital consent at eighteen for women and twenty-one for men.54
Because the Women’s Rights Movement began making headway
during this time, many challenged the lower age of marital consent
for women (eighteen) compared with the higher age of marital con-
sent for men (twenty-one).55 Further, as women began entering the
workforce with increasing equality, marriage began to lose its so-
cial value “as the sole socially acceptable path to intimate relation-
ship, economic security, and family life.”56 In 1971, after Congress
granted men and women the right to vote at age eighteen, most
states amended their statutory age of marital consent to eighteen
for both men and women.57
II. VARIATIONS IN CURRENT STATE CHILD MARRIAGE LAWS 
Today, although states have generally adopted eighteen as the
statutory age of marital consent,58 child marriage laws continue to
vary widely among states.59 Because most states require individu-
als to be at least eighteen to independently consent to marriage,
52. See Hamilton, supra note 28, at 1831.
53. See Wardle, supra note 18, at 8. 
54. See Jackson, supra note 17, at 354 (noting that, prior to 1971, 80 percent of states set
the age of marital consent at eighteen for women, and 85 percent of states set the age of
marital consent at twenty-one for men). 
55. See id.; Wardle, supra note 18, at 8.
56. Hamilton, supra note 28, at 1840. 
57. See Dahl, supra note 13, at 698.
58. The presumptive age of marital consent is eighteen in every state except Nebraska
(where the age of marital consent is nineteen) and Mississippi (where the presumptive age
of marital consent is seventeen for males, and fifteen for females). See MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-
1-5(1) (2018); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 42-102, 42-105, 43-2101 (2018).
59. Jackson, supra note 17, at 351. 
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eighteen is considered the “statutory minimum marriage age.”60
Despite this statutory minimum age, all states, with the exception
of Delaware and New Jersey,61 allow various loopholes for children
wishing to marry before eighteen, such as provisions allowing child-
ren below eighteen to marry with either parental or judicial consent
(or both).62 For example, many states allow underage children to
marry with parental consent alone.63 Other states require that
underage children have both parental and judicial approval to
marry.64 Additionally, some states only require children to have
judicial consent to marry, which effectively removes the need for
parental consent.65 States also often give courts authority to ap-
prove child marriage for “moral” or “welfare” reasons (for example,
pregnancy).66
Some states set statutory floors for age of marriageability, mean-
ing a child below the statutorily set age floor cannot marry.67
Statutory floors for marriageability vary from state to state.68
Eighteen states do not set statutory age floors, meaning there is no
minimum age below which a child cannot marry when exceptions
60. TAHIRIH JUSTICE CTR., UNDERSTANDING STATE STATUTES ON MINIMUM MARRIAGE AGE
AND EXCEPTIONS 1 (2018), https://www.tahirih.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/2018-State-
Marriage-Age-Requirements-Statutory-Compilation.pdf [https://perma.cc/9WVD-R8B3]. 
61. See supra note 18.
62. Id. at 2.
63. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-1-5 (2018); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 14-2-106(1)(a)(I), -108(1)
(2018); D.C. CODE § 46-411 (2018); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-2(b) (2018); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/203 (2018); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-03-02, -17(1) (2017); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-250 (2018);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-1-9 (2018); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-106(a)-(d) (2018); W. VA. CODE
§ 48-2-301(d) (2018); WIS. STAT. § 765.02(2) (2017).
64. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.171(b) (2018) (allowing children over fourteen to
marry with parental consent and judicial approval); IOWA CODE § 595.2(4) (2018) (requiring
the underage child’s parent to consent to the marriage and district court approval); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 122.025(1)-(2) (2017) (allowing children under the age of sixteen to marry with par-
ental consent and district court approval). 
65. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-48 (2018) (allowing minors to marry only when the minor
has been emancipated by court order). 
66. See Jackson, supra note 17, at 354. 
67. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-2(a)-(b1) (2018) (disallowing any exception for children
under fourteen to marry); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-2(3) (West 2018) (disallowing any exception
for children under fifteen to marry); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5142 (2018) (disallowing any ex-
ception for children under sixteen to marry).
68. See e.g., supra note 67.
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are met.69 Other states have adopted statutory age floors of either
fourteen,70 fifteen,71 sixteen,72 or seventeen years old.73 Further, ma-
ny states have enacted statutes that vary based on gender.74 For
example, under Arkansas statutory law, girls are permitted to mar-
ry with parental consent at sixteen, but boys are not permitted to
marry with parental consent until seventeen.75
In 2016, Virginia made strides to protect minors from child mar-
riage’s harmful effects by enacting stringent child marriage laws:
requiring children to reach legal marriage status (eighteen) with a
narrow exception for children between sixteen and seventeen if the
court emancipated the child.76 Finally, in May 2018, Delaware
69. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-11-102, -103, -209 (2018); CAL. FAM. CODE § 302 (West 2018);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-106(1)(a)(I) (2018); IDAHO CODE §§ 32-202, 32-302(4) (2018); LA. STAT.
ANN. § 9:225(A)(2) (2018); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. arts. 1545(B), 1547-49 (2018); ME. STAT. tit.
19-A, § 652(7)-(8) (2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 207, §§ 7, 24, 25 (2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§§ 551.51, 551.103(1), 551.201(2) (2018); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-1-5(1)(d) (2018); MO. REV.
STAT. §§ 451.020, 451.090 (2018); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 122.020(3), 122.025 (2017); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 40-1-6 (2018); OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, §§ 3(B), 5(A) (2018); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1304(b)
(2018); 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-2-11(b) (2018); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.010(2) (2018); W. VA.
CODE § 48-2-301(a)-(c) (2018); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-102 (2018). 
70. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.171(b) (2018) (“A superior court judge may grant
permission for a person who has reached the age of 14 but is under age of 18 to marry.”); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 51-2.1(a) (2018) (allowing an unmarried girl between fourteen and sixteen to
marry if she is pregnant or has given birth to a child, and an unmarried boy to marry if he is
the father of the born or unborn child). 
71. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-1(1)-(2) (2018); IND. CODE § 31-11-1-6(b)(1) (2018);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-2505(c)(1) (2018); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 2-301(c) (West 2018);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-2(3) (West 2018).
72. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 30-1-4, -5 (2018); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-102(b) (2018);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-20a(b) (2018); D.C. CODE § 46-403(4) (2018); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-2
(2018); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/203(1) (2018); IOWA CODE § 595.2(4) (2018); MINN. STAT.
§ 517.02 (2018); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-213(1) (West 2017); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03-02
(2017); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-100 (2018); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-1-9 (2018); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 5142(2) (2018); WIS. STAT. § 765.02(2) (2018).
73. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 42-102, 42-105, 43-2101 (2018) (setting a statutory age
floor of seventeen for child marriage and requiring parental consent until the child is
nineteen); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 15(3) (McKinney 2018) (setting the age floor at seventeen and
requiring judicial approval for the marriage of seventeen-year-olds); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3101.02 (West 2019) (setting the age floor at seventeen and requiring judicial approval, but
also allowing seventeen-year-olds to marry someone no younger than fourteen and still re-
quiring judicial approval); OR. REV. STAT. § 106.010 (2018) (setting the age floor at seventeen). 
74. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-1-5(1) (allowing underage marriage for girls at age
fifteen and boys at age seventeen with parental consent and judicial approval).
75. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-11-102(a), -105(a) (2018).
76. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-48 (2018) (“The minimum age at which persons may marry
shall be 18, unless a minor has been emancipated by court order.”).
2019] STATE REGULATIONS ARE FAILING OUR CHILDREN 2349
became the first state to enact a blanket ban against child mar-
riage by requiring children to reach the age of eighteen to marry.77
New Jersey followed shortly after.78
In sum, there is a great deal of variation in child marriage laws
from state to state. Although some states have taken great strides
to enact stricter child marriage requirements, others continue to
provide exceptions that fail to protect children from child marriage’s
harmful effects.
III. NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF EARLY MARRIAGE
Early child marriage has devastating and lifelong mental, social,
and physical effects on children, especially young girls.79 First, this
Part will discuss child marriage’s negative consequences on family
life, as well as the increased risk of intimate partner violence. Next,
this Part will discuss early child marriage’s ramifications on edu-
cational attainment and its risk of future poverty to show the life-
long consequences. Finally, this Part will conclude with an analysis
of early child marriage’s mental and physical effects on young girls.
A. Family Instability
According to a report from the Tahirih Justice Center—a non-
governmental organization committed to addressing gender based
violence—approximately 70 to 80 percent of marriages where at
least one party is under the age of eighteen end in divorce.80
Researchers have also found that early marriage is one of the best
predictors of marital failure.81 Children who marry in their mid-
77. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 123(a) (2018).
78. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-6 (West 2018).
79. See Burris, supra note 6, at 152.
80. TAHIRIH JUSTICE CTR., supra note 7. 
81. See Hamilton, supra note 28, 1819-20; see also TAHIRIH JUSTICE CTR., supra note 7
(“Between 70-80% of marriages involving individuals under age 18 end in divorce.”); Tim B.
Heaton, Factors Contributing to Increasing Marital Stability in the United States, 23 J. FAM.
ISSUES 392, 405-07 (2002) (arguing that the recent decline in marital disruptions (for ex-
ample, divorce) is a result of the reduced incidents of child marriages). A recent study by
sociologist Nicholas Wolfinger also recognized that teens experienced a higher risk of divorce
compared to adults, and noted that “prior to age 32 or so, each additional year of age at
marriage reduces the odds of divorce by 11 percent.” Nicholas H. Wolfinger, Want to Avoid
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teens experience the highest marital failure rates—approximately
80 percent.82 Marriages entered prior to age eighteen experience a
70 percent divorce rate.83 In contrast, individuals who postpone mar-
riage to age twenty-five experience significantly lower marriage dis-
solution rates, with fewer than 30 percent of marriages ending in
divorce.84
The judiciary has also recognized early child marriage’s negative
consequences and the importance of protecting vulnerable youth. In
Moe v. Dinkins, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals refused to grant
permission to two underage couples to marry without parental con-
sent.85 The Second Circuit highlighted the State’s “important in-
terest in promoting the welfare of children by preventing unstable
marriages among those lacking the capacity to act in their own best
interest.”86 Therefore, the Second Circuit acknowledged child mar-
riage’s harmful effects and stressed the importance of protecting
children from entering into such harmful unions.
B. Intimate Partner Violence
Not only are young brides more vulnerable to unstable mar-
riages, but this general instability also increases the likelihood that
the young girl will fall victim to intimate partner violence.87 Girls
between the ages of sixteen and twenty-four are most vulnerable to
intimate partner violence, and girls between sixteen and nineteen
are three times more likely to fall victim to intimate partner vio-
lence.88 Thus, not only does early child marriage have a negative
Divorce? Wait to Get Married, But Not too Long, INST. FOR FAM. STUD. (July 16, 2015), https://
ifstudies.org/blog/want-to-avoid-divorce-wait-to-get-married-but-not-too-long/
[https://perma.cc/PLQ2-EENV]. Wolfinger also found that the risk of divorce within five years
of a person’s first marriage was higher for younger individuals: 32 percent for individuals
under 20 years old, 20 percent for individuals 20-24 years old, and 14 percent for individuals
30-34 years old. Id.
82. Hamilton, supra note 28, at 1820. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. 669 F.2d 67, 68 (2d Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
86. Id.
87. See Jackson, supra note 17, at 370-71. 
88. TAHIRIH JUSTICE CTR., supra note 7. 
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impact on a marriage’s stability, but it also makes children more
vulnerable to physical harm at the hands of their spouses.
Additionally, because children under the age of eighteen lack
legal standing in many states, the child is often unable to obtain a
divorce or utilize other resources available to intimate partner
violence victims. As one member of the Delaware legislature put it:
“Children under 18 have no legal standing—they cannot file for
divorce, utilize a domestic violence shelter, apply for a loan or open
a credit card.”89 Therefore, the child is often left trapped in the vio-
lent marriage.90
Finally, victims of physical and sexual abuse are significantly
more likely to become pregnant.91 The risk of pregnancy increases
even further when the young girl’s partner is older because younger
partners tend to have little control over contraceptive decisions in
the relationship, which increases their vulnerability to unexpected
pregnancy.92 Thus, in addition to divorce, instability, and abuse,
early child marriage can leave a young girl with the additional
economic and mental burden of having to raise a child either alone
or in an abusive relationship.
C. Education and Future Poverty
The negative effects of early marriage on education are well
studied and documented. Professor Gordon Dahl, an economics
professor at the University of California, San Diego, studied early
marriage’s effects on high school drop out rates and future poverty
and found that “women who marry before the age of 19 are 50 per-
cent more likely to drop out of high school” than their peers.93
Further, women who marry young are four times less likely to
graduate from college.94 Dahl’s study also found that early marriage
is a better indicator of future poverty than dropping out of high
89. Bethlehem Feleke, Delaware Becomes First US State to Fully Ban Child Marriage,
CNN (May 12, 2018, 9:09 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/12/us/delaware-child-marriage-
ban/index.html [https://perma.cc/63ZN-8B4G].
90. See id.
91. See Jackson, supra note 17, at 343.
92. See id. at 375.
93. See Dahl, supra note 13, at 691.
94. Id. 
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school.95 Early marriage increased the likelihood that the child
would live in poverty in the future by 31 percent.96 In contrast,
dropping out of high school increased the likelihood that the child
would live in poverty in the future by 11 percent.97 The high school
drop out rate also varies depending on how young the child mar-
ries.98 Dahl reported that 87 percent of early teen brides—fifteen or
younger—did not graduate from high school, compared with 66
percent of children between the ages of sixteen and seventeen, and
29 percent of children eighteen to nineteen.99 However, these
statistics only apply to young girls, because it is significantly less
likely that a young girl’s husband will drop out of high school.100
Early marriage interrupts a young girl’s education, limits her
ability to become financially independent, and increases her like-
lihood of living in poverty in the event of divorce.101 These factors
also limit the young girl’s ability to leave if the marriage becomes
violent.102
Early child marriage’s negative implications—such as high school
drop out rates and the likelihood of future poverty—also have wide
reaching implications on third parties and society. Early marriage
leads to higher divorce rates, lower wages, and larger family sizes,103
which “increases the number of children living in poverty and re-
ceiving state assistance,” thus raising welfare expenditures and the
taxpayer’s burden.104 Therefore, early child marriage has negative
external costs on both society at large and the individual child.
95. Id. at 711 tbl.7.
96. Id. at 707, 714.
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 713.
99. Id. 
100. See id. at 713-14.
101. See TAHIRIH JUSTICE CTR., supra note 7. 
102. See id.
103. Teen brides tend to have more children, as well as have children at a younger age.
Dahl, supra note 13, at 691.
104. Id. at 690-91.
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D. Mental and Physical Health
Early marriage has extreme negative consequences for the young
bride’s mental health. Yann Le Strat, Caroline Dubertret, and
Bernard Le Foll studied early marriage’s effects on women’s mental
health, after controlling for sociodemographic factors.105 The study
found that the majority of women who married young had a history
of mental health disorders (53.09 percent), whereas a smaller per-
centage of women who married as adults reported a history of
mental health disorders (49.05 percent).106 Specifically, women who
married as children had higher rates of depression, nicotine depen-
dence, specific phobias, dysthymia, and antisocial personality
disorder.107 In general, the study found that child brides were sig-
nificantly more likely to experience a psychiatric disorder in their
lifetimes.108 Another study found that girls who married at age
eighteen or younger had higher depression rates compared to wom-
en who married at twenty-one or older.109
Early marriage also has negative consequences on young girls’
physical health. There is a strong correlation between early child
marriage and early childbirth.110 This is concerning because girls
who give birth at a young age face serious health consequences,
including higher maternal morbidity rates, higher risks of obstruct-
ed labor, pregnancy-induced hypertension, and suffering from ob-
stetric fistula (a condition where the vagina, bladder, and/or rectum
tear during childbirth which may cause severe consequences if left
untreated such as leakage of bladder and feces).111 Girls suffer these
105. See Le Strat et al., supra note 15, at 527.
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. at 527-28. 
109. See Jeremy Elliot Uecker, Early Marriage in the United States: Why Some Marry
Young, Why Many Don’t, and What Difference It Makes 169-71 (May 2010) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas at Austin) (available at https://repositories.lib.utexas.
edu/bitstream/handle/2152/ETD-UT-2010-05-1158/UECKER-DISSERTATION.pdf?
sequence=1&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/65NX-YVZE]).
110. SARANGA JAIN & KATHLEEN KURZ, INT’L CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON WOMEN, NEW INSIGHTS
ON PREVENTING CHILD MARRIAGE 7 (2007), http://lastradainternational.org/lsidocs/icrw_
child_marriage_0607.pdf [https://perma.cc/7A3V-PBYY].
111. Id. 
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health consequences because the girl’s body is not mature enough
for childbirth at such a young age.112
Young girls are also at an increased risk of contracting sexually
transmitted diseases because girls who enter into early marriages
usually lack adequate information about important sexual and re-
productive health issues (for example, contraception, sexual inter-
course, sexually transmitted diseases, pregnancy, and childbirth).113
Further, a girl’s lack of power in the relationship compounds the
lack of information, which leads to higher rates of violence, unwant-
ed pregnancy, and sexually transmitted disease.114 Child brides
often marry much older men, and the girls often have little negotiat-
ing power in the relationship over sexual behavior, such as using
condoms or other contraceptives.115 Finally, researchers have noted
a correlation between child marriage and an increased risk of heart
attack, diabetes, cancer, and stroke for women due to lack of re-
sources; yet, researchers did not find a correlation between early
child marriage and negative physical health implications for
males.116
Early child marriage’s negative health consequences extend to
the young girl’s infant as well. A teen mother’s infant is twice as
likely to die before the infant’s first birthday compared to infants of
mothers in their twenties.117 Further, one million teen mothers’
infants die every year from pregnancy and child-birth compli-
cations.118 The child also has an increased risk of lower birth weight
and premature birth,119 as well as an increased likelihood that the
child will receive inadequate nutrition.120 Even if the infant survives
112. Id. 
113. See id. at 7-9.
114. Id. at 8.
115. SANYUKTA MATHUR, MARGARET GREENE & ANJU MALHOTRA, INT’L CTR. FOR RESEARCH
ON WOMEN, TOO YOUNG TO WED: THE LIVES, RIGHTS, AND HEALTH OF YOUNG MARRIED GIRLS
9 (2003), https://www.issuelab.org/resources/11421/11421.pdf [https://perma.cc/TYE3-97HV].
116. Hamilton, supra note 28, at 1848 (“[T]he negative impact of early marriage on
women’s health [is] unsurprising, ‘given that these females may forfeit important health re-
sources and often face a greater likelihood of divorce.’” (citation omitted)).
117. JAIN & KURZ, supra note 110, at 8. 
118. Id. (“Currently, 1 million infants of young mothers die every year worldwide as a re-
sult of pregnancy and childbirth related causes.”). 
119. Id. 
120. Id. (“After birth, infants of teen mothers are more likely than infants born to older
mothers to have poorer health care and inadequate nutrition as a result of their young
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past one year, teen mothers’ infants are more likely to experience
developmental delays than older mothers’ infants, including
behavioral problems and educational underachievement.121 Further,
because older parents often have greater financial resources, higher
educational attainment, and are usually more emotionally mature,
older parents are generally more likely to stimulate child develop-
ment than younger parents.122 These negative effects have lifelong
consequences on the children, including an increased chance of fu-
ture poverty which perpetuates the cycle of poverty.123
IV. STATE CHILD MARRIAGE LAWS ARE INSUFFICIENT 
Leaving child marriage laws up to state discretion has proven
insufficient to protect vulnerable youth in the United States, specif-
ically young girls. In 2010, Dahl tested strict state marriage laws’
impact on the probability of early child marriage.124 Dahl studied
whether teens traveled to states with a lower age of marriageability
to evade their state of residence’s marriage requirement.125 If teens
were traveling to states with lower age of marriageability require-
ments, this would suggest that strict child marriage laws were im-
posing costs on children who wished to marry early.126
Dahl’s analysis used Tennessee as a case-study because Ten-
nessee is a long, narrow state that borders many different states
with different age of marriageability requirements.127 In 1968-69,
Tennessee’s age of consent was sixteen,128 and Tennessee was
mothers’ poor feeding behavior.”).
121. See Hamilton, supra note 28, at 1848-49. 
122. Id. at 1849 (citing NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES:
LEGAL POLARIZATION AND THE CREATION OF CULTURE 55 (2010)). However, studies on the
brain development of teen mothers’ infants have not isolated the mother’s marital status, and
some researchers argue that infants of young mothers display fewer developmental issues if
the parents are married. See id.
123. See id. at 1849-50.
124. Dahl, supra note 13, at 702.
125. Id. at 702-04.
126. Id. at 702 (“Some young teens will cross state lines, while others will be deterred by
these costs. The extent to which teens cross state lines to marry in states with more per-
missive laws can be examined using the resident state and marriage state information.”). 
127. Id. 
128. Id. Dahl used data from 1968-69 because it was the period for which the Vital Statis-
tics data were available. Id.
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bordered by eight states with varying child marriage laws.129 Dahl
hypothesized that if stricter child marriage laws actually prevented
early child marriage, he would expect to see children under the age
of sixteen traveling to states such as Alabama, Mississippi, or
Missouri, which had lower child marriage age requirements.130 Dahl
also noted that he would not expect to see children traveling to
Georgia, Kentucky, or Virginia to marry, where the age of mar-
riageability was also sixteen.131
Dahl found that “[t]he pattern of out-of-state marriages strongly
supports the idea that Tennessee teens traveled to bordering states
with more permissive laws in order to marry young.”132 Of girls in
Tennessee who married under the age of sixteen, 22 percent trav-
eled to Alabama, Mississippi, or Missouri to marry, and only 4 per-
cent traveled to Georgia, Kentucky, or Virginia.133 This evidence
suggests that young teens traveled to states with less restrictive
child marriage laws to avoid the higher age threshold in Ten-
nessee.134
Dahl then extended his study to all states and found that 15.3
percent of children who married between ages twelve and fifteen
and lived in states with sixteen as the age of consent traveled to
states with lower age of marriageability requirements to get
married.135 In comparison, in states with age of marriageability
requirements between thirteen and fifteen, only 5 percent of chil-
dren below the age of sixteen traveled outside their state to
marry.136
This is not to say that strict child marriage laws are altogether
ineffective. Dahl’s study also found that there was a large jump in
the number of children married immediately after the state-
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
131. See id. 
132. Id. at 703 (finding that children under the age of sixteen traveled to Alabama,
Mississippi, and Missouri to avoid Tennessee’s more stringent marriage laws). 
133. Id. Dahl did not find that teens were traveling to Alabama, Mississippi, and Missouri
to marry because those states were favorable wedding destinations; rather, Dahl found that
Georgia, Virginia, and Kentucky were actually more favorable wedding destinations. Id. 
134. Id. at 702-03 (concluding that teens do in fact travel to states with lower age re-
quirements to get married). 
135. Id. at 703.
136. Id.
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specified age of marriageability, which suggests that state laws are
effective in preventing child marriage within the state.137 Dahl ob-
served that “[i]n states with legal minima of 12-13, 14, 15, and 16+,
the percentage of women who [were] early teen brides [was], re-
spectively, 6.5 percent, 4.3 percent, 3.5 percent, and 2.9 percent.”138
This, combined with the drastic jump in the number of teens mar-
ried immediately after they reach the marital consent age,139
suggests that marriage laws are effective when teens are not able
to travel to neighboring states with less restrictive child marriage
laws to evade their residence states’ stricter requirements.140
V. FEDERAL SPENDING POWER AND UNIFORM CHILD MARRIAGE
STANDARDS
Because children can travel to states with less stringent require-
ments, and thus so easily bypass strict child marriage laws, federal
reform is vital to protect the United States’ youth. This Part will
discuss Congress’s ability to use its spending power to enact uniform
child marriage laws. First, this Part will discusses the standard
that the Court laid out in South Dakota v. Dole.141 Then it will apply
the Dole test to child marriage laws and argue that conditioning
federal education funds on states enacting certain child marriage
laws is well within Congress’s spending power.
A. South Dakota v. Dole
South Dakota v. Dole involved a challenge to Congress’s enact-
ment of 23 U.S.C. § 158, which required states to establish twenty-
one as the minimum alcohol consumption and possession age, or
risk losing federal highway funds.142 At the time, South Dakota
137. For example, if child marriage laws are effective at preventing early marriage, one
would expect to see a large jump in the number of teens married the year after the age of
marriageability (that is, if the age of marriageability is sixteen, Dahl would expect to see a
large jump in the number of children marrying at sixteen or seventeen in that state). See
id. at 700. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. at 701 fig.3.
140. See id. at 700-02.
141. 483 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1987).
142. Id. at 205.
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permitted individuals nineteen or older to purchase beer containing
up to 3.2 percent alcohol, so it challenged the statute as a violation
of the Twenty-First Amendment.143
The Court in Dole made clear that the “Twenty-[F]irst Amend-
ment grants the States virtually complete control over whether to
permit importation or sale of liquor and how to structure the liquor
distribution system.”144 However, the Court concluded that the Act
was within Congress’s constitutional authority because Congress
acted indirectly under its spending power to regulate state drink-
ing age requirements.145
The Constitution explicitly gives Congress the power to “lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay the Debts and
provide for the common Defen[s]e and general Welfare of the United
States.”146 The Court concluded that “[i]ncident to this power, Con-
gress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds, and has
repeatedly employed the power ‘to further broad policy objectives
by conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon compliance by the
recipient with federal statutory and administrative directives.’”147
However, the Court went on to say that Congress’s spending pow-
er is limited.148 The Court then laid out five general restrictions on
Congress’s spending power, which make up the Dole test.149 First,
Congress must exercise its spending power in pursuit of the general
welfare, and the Court should give great deference to Congress’s de-
cision about whether the expenditure serves the general welfare.150
143. Id. 
144. Id. (quoting Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97,
110 (1980)). 
145. See id. at 206. 
146. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
147. Dole, 483 U.S. at 206 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980)); see
also Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 569 (1974) (holding that Congress can condition federal
financial assistance on institutions’ compliance with § 601 of the Civil Rights Act); Ivanhoe
Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 295 (1958) (holding that it “is the power of the
Federal Government to impose reasonable conditions on the use of federal funds”); Oklahoma
v. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 330 U.S. 127, 144 (1947) (“The offer of benefits to a state by the
United States dependent upon cooperation by the state with federal plans, assumedly for the
general welfare, is not unusual.”). 
148. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S.
1, 17, 17 n.13 (1981)) (“The spending power is of course not unlimited, but is instead subject
to several general restrictions articulated in our cases.”).
149. See id. at 207-08, 211. 
150. See id. at 207. 
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Second, if Congress uses its spending power, it “must do so unam-
biguously ..., enabl[ing] the States to exercise their choice knowing-
ly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation.”151 Third,
there must be a nexus between the expenditure and the condition
Congress imposes.152 Fourth, the condition imposed on the expendi-
ture must not violate individuals’ Constitutional rights.153 Finally,
the “financial inducement offered by Congress [must not] be so coer-
cive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into compul-
sion.’”154
In Dole, the Court concluded that Congress’s main goal with
respect to highway funds was safe interstate travel, and varying
drinking ages amongst states frustrated that goal.155 The Court
adopted findings of a Presidential Commission appointed to study
road accidents and deaths relating to alcohol and concluded that the
“lack of uniformity in the States’ drinking ages created ‘an incentive
to drink and drive’ because ‘young persons commute[d] to border
States where the drinking age [was] lower.’”156 The Court further
found that conditioning highway funding on whether the state
established a minimum drinking age of twenty-one was not coercive
because the state only risked losing a relatively small percentage of
highway safety funds.157 Finally, the fact that the condition was
successful at achieving its objective—encouraging states to set the
minimum drinking age requirement at twenty-one to lower the
151. Id. at 207 (alteration in original) (quoting Halderman, 451 U.S. at 17). 
152. See id. at 207-08; see also Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978)
(plurality opinion) (holding that conditions imposed under the spending power must be
“reasonably related to the federal interest in particular national projects or programs”);
Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist., 357 U.S. at 295 (“[T]he Federal Government may establish and
impose reasonable conditions relevant to federal interest in the project and to the over-all
objectives thereof.”). 
153. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 208; see also Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist. No.
40-1, 469 U.S. 256, 269-70 (1985) (noting that Congress cannot use the spending power to
impose conditions that violate the Constitution); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90-91 (1976)
(holding that Congress’s spending power is not limited by express grants of legislative power
in the Constitution). 
154. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)). 
155. Id. at 208-09. 
156. Id. at 209 (citation omitted).
157. Id. at 211. 
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rates of alcohol-related accidents and fatalities—did not render the
condition coercive.158
B. Applying Dole to Uniform Child Marriage Laws 
Next, this Part will apply the Dole test to argue that Congress
should use its spending power to enact rigorous uniform child mar-
riage laws. Like state drinking age requirements, child marriage
laws lack uniformity and frustrate Congress’s goal and duty to pro-
tect children and ensure that every child has access to a quality
education.159 Lack of uniformity in child marriage laws state-to-state
has created an end-run around stricter laws, allowing children to
enter into early marriages.160 Whether by force or by choice, early
marriages have long-lasting and devastating implications for the
child and society at large.161 Thus, federal reform is necessary to
address these inconsistencies and ensure the safety of young and
vulnerable children. Applying the five-part Dole test, Congress
should utilize its spending power to condition receipt of federal edu-
cation grants on states enacting rigorous child marriage laws sim-
ilar to what Delaware and New Jersey recently implemented.162
Specifically, Congress should condition the receipt of 10 percent of
the states’ federal education funding on the requirement that states
set the minimum age of marriageability at eighteen, with no excep-
tions (even for judicial emancipation or parental consent).
In 2018, Delaware became the first state to ban child marriage
when it set the minimum age of marriage at eighteen, with no ex-
ceptions; New Jersey followed shortly after.163 Delaware’s and New
Jersey’s child marriage laws have effectively removed parental con-
sent, pregnancy, and judicial emancipation from the decision re-
garding whether a child should marry, recognizing that minors have
insufficient legal capacity to enter into certain agreements, so child
158. Id. 
159. See infra Part V.B.3. 
160. See, e.g., Dahl, supra note 13, at 702-04 (studying how young couples evaded child
marriage age restrictions in Tennessee by crossing the state’s border).
161. See supra Part III. 
162. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 123(a) (2018); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-6 (West 2018).
163. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 123(a); § 37:1-6.
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marriage should not be treated any differently.164 However, two
states bordering Delaware—Pennsylvania and Maryland—vary in
their minimum age of marriageability requirements.165 Similarly,
two states bordering New Jersey—Pennsylvania and New York—
also have varying child marriage requirements.166 Therefore, despite
Delaware’s and New Jersey’s laudable efforts to protect vulnerable
children, it remains all too easy for children to travel to a neighbor-
ing state to get around Delaware’s and New Jersey’s strict state
marriage laws.
This Part argues that (1) uniform child marriage laws increase
the general welfare of society, (2) the condition is unambiguous,
(3) conditioning federal education funds on strict child marriage
requirements has a close nexus to federal education funding,
(4) stricter child marriage laws do not infringe on either children’s
or parents’ constitutional rights, and (5) conditioning federal edu-
cation funds on strict child marriage requirements does not rise to
the level of coerciveness necessary to invalidate the law.
1. General Welfare and Child Marriage Laws 
It is worth repeating that the Court has historically shown great
deference to Congress regarding the welfare-maximizing capacity of
conditions attached to expenditures.167 Further, it is not hard to
argue that strict child marriage requirements further society’s gen-
eral welfare. As previously discussed in Part III, child marriage has
numerous negative consequences: increased high school drop-out
164. See Feleke, supra note 89. 
165. Pennsylvania has no minimum age of marriageability, and allows children under
sixteen to marry if the court decides it is in the “best interest” of the child. 23 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 1304(b) (2018). Maryland sets the minimum age of marriageability at fifteen, and allows
children to marry with parental consent if the child is pregnant. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW
§ 2-301(b)-(c) (West 2018).
166. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 15(3) (McKinney 2018) (setting seventeen as the minimum age
of marriageability); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1304(b) (setting no minimum age of marriageability).
167. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987); see also Helvering v. Davis, 301
U.S. 619, 640-41 (1937) (discussing the fluidity of general welfare and the need for
Congressional discretion to determine what is in the general welfare). 
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rates, increased chance of future poverty,168 and negative mental
and physical health implications.169
Further, child marriage’s negative effects are not limited to forced
child marriages because even consensual child marriages can lead
to serious and long-term consequences. For example, marriages be-
tween couples in their mid-teens have approximately an 80 percent
chance of divorce.170 Because it is extremely likely that the young
female partner will drop out of school, rather than the young
male,171 if the couple divorces later in life (which is statistically
probable)172 then the young girl will likely be left without the edu-
cation or financial means to support herself or her children.173
Further, most teens are not capable of accurately assessing short-
term benefits versus long-term costs, which leads to teens engaging
in risky behaviors.174 Because early child marriage’s long-term
effects are well studied and documented,175 and teens cannot reli-
ably consider the long-term implications of their short-term ac-
tions,176 it is necessary for Congress to use its spending power to
urge states to enact stricter child marriage laws for children’s gen-
eral welfare.
Uniform child marriage laws are also a vital benefit to educating
the United States’ youth. As previously discussed, early child
marriage has detrimental effects on young girls’ future educational
attainment, including a decreased likelihood of graduating high
school and attending college.177 Further, the United States has
168. See generally Dahl, supra note 13.
169. See Hamilton, supra note 28, at 1847-48 (noting the increased risk of domestic violence
in early marriages); Le Strat et al., supra note 15, at 527-30 (discussing the increased risk of
mental health issues associated with child marriage); MATHUR ET AL., supra note 115, at 6-9
(discussing the risk of physical harm to child brides and risks of early childbirth). 
170. See Heaton, supra note 81, at 407 fig.2.
171. See Hamilton, supra note 28, at 1846.
172. See id. at 1820.
173. Cf. Dahl, supra note 13, at 690 (“Both teenage marriage and dropping out of high
school are closely associated with a variety of negative outcomes, including poverty later in
life.”). 
174. See Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Risky Behavior Among Youths: Some Issues
from Behavioral Economics, in RISKY BEHAVIOR AMONG YOUTHS 29, 63 (Jonathan Gruber ed.,
2001) (arguing that legislatures must create incentives for teens to consider the link between
short-term decisions and long-term costs).
175. See supra Part III. 
176. See O’Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 174, at 63. 
177. TAHIRIH JUSTICE CTR., supra note 7.
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historically considered providing strong public education as one of
the most important government functions.178 The state and federal
government have a strong interest in ensuring the vitality of future
generations, and a strong public education system is arguably the
most important factor in achieving this objective.179 Thus, regulating
child marriage to reduce the risk of young girls dropping out of
school would further society’s general welfare, and help further the
strong government interest in providing adequate education to fu-
ture generations.
2. Conditions Imposed by Congress Must Be Unambiguous
In South Dakota v. Dole, the Supreme Court held that “we have
required that if Congress desires to condition the States’ receipt of
federal funds, it ‘must do so unambiguously ..., enabl[ing] the States
to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of
their participation.’”180 In other words, Congress must clearly and
explicitly tell the states what condition Congress is placing on re-
ceipt of federal funds.181
In Dole, the Court held that conditioning federal highway funds
on states setting the minimum drinking age at twenty-one “could
not be more clearly stated by Congress.”182 Similarly, Congress could
enact legislation conditioning receipt of federal public education
funds on states enacting legislation setting the minimum age of
marriageability at eighteen, with no exception. This would clearly
and explicitly lay out what states must do; otherwise, the state risks
losing federal public education funding. This clear condition would
allow states to “exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the
consequences of their participation.”183 In sum, Congress should not
have difficulty meeting Dole’s “unambiguous” requirement.
178. See infra note 189 and accompanying text.
179. See infra note 189 and accompanying text.
180. 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (alteration in original) (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp.
v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)). 
181. See Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17.
182. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208. 
183. See Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17. 
2364 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:2337
3. Nexus Between Child Marriage and Education
When utilizing its spending power, Congress must also satisfy the
nexus requirement.184 The Court has not significantly elaborated on
the nexus requirement to provide significant guidance for this
analysis,185 and the Court in Dole stated that its “cases have not re-
quired that [the Court] define the outer bounds of the ‘germaneness’
or ‘relatedness’ limitation on the imposition of conditions under the
spending power.”186 The Court in Dole found that the States frus-
trated Congress’s goal to provide interstate highway safety because
the states lacked uniformity in minimum drinking age require-
ments.187 Thus, Congress sufficiently met the nexus requirement
because it conditioned federal funds on a method “reasonably calcu-
lated to address [the] particular impediment to a purpose for which
the funds [we]re expended.”188
Similarly, lack of uniformity amongst state child marriage laws
frustrates Congress’s interest in educating future generations.
Historically, public education has been regarded as one of the most
important government functions.189 In Brown v. Board of Education,
the Supreme Court declared:
[Education] is required in the performance of our most basic
public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the
very foundation of good citizenship. Today, it is a principal in-
strument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing
184. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207-08 (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461
(1978) (plurality opinion)) (“[C]onditions on federal grants might be illegitimate if they are
unrelated ‘to the federal interest in particular national projects or programs.’”).
185. See id. at 207; see also Massachusetts, 435 U.S. at 461 (“We have repeatedly held that
the Federal Government may impose appropriate conditions on the use of federal property.”);
Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 295 (1958) (“The lesson of these cases
is that the Federal Government may establish and impose reasonable conditions.”). 
186. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208 n.3.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 209.
189. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (“[E]ducation has a fundamental role
in maintaining the fabric of our society.”); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972)
(“[S]ome degree of education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and
intelligently in our open political system if we are to preserve freedom and independence.”);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (“The American people have always regarded
education and acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance which should be
diligently promoted.”).
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him for later professional training, and in helping him adjust
normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that
any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is
denied the opportunity of an education.190
Although the Court in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez held that children do not have a fundamental right to
education, the Court went on to state that “[n]othing this Court
holds today in any way detracts from our historic dedication to pub-
lic education.”191 Thus, public education remains a vital duty of the
American government.192
Despite the importance of providing adequate education to all
children in the United States, state legislatures have failed to ad-
dress one of the most significant impediments to education: child
marriage. Despite some states’ efforts to implement stricter child
marriage requirements,193 the child’s ability to travel to a neighbor-
ing state with looser child marriage requirements and evade the
stricter laws frustrates individual state efforts.194 Therefore, despite
some states’ advancements, lack of uniformity is a major impedi-
ment to preventing child marriage and ensuring all children receive
an adequate education.
Because lack of uniformity among states’ child marriage laws
allows children to evade stricter marriage requirements, and child
marriage frustrates Congress’s important government function to
provide public education to all youth, federal education funding and
minimum age of marriageability laws are sufficiently linked to meet
the Dole nexus requirement.
4. Uniform Child Marriage Requirements Do Not Violate
Children’s or Parents’ Constitutional Rights
Next, the Court has held that “constitutional provisions may pro-
vide an independent bar to the conditional grant of federal funds.”195
190. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
191. 411 U.S. 1, 30 (1973).
192. See id.
193. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-45.1(c), 20-48, 16.1-331 (2018).
194. See Dahl, supra note 13, at 702-03. 
195. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 208 (1987).
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The Court further interpreted this provision to mean that Congress
cannot condition federal funds on a provision that requires states to
engage in activity that violates individuals’ constitutional rights.196
This Part argues that constitutional challenges to federal child
marriage reform will fail, including (1) federalism challenges,
(2) Fourteenth Amendment Due Process challenges, and (3) First
Amendment Free Exercise of Religion challenges.
a. Federalism and Uniform Child Marriage Laws 
First, states could argue that marriage is an issue traditionally
under state jurisdiction;197 thus, it is improper for Congress to use
its spending power to regulate child marriage laws. However, the
Twenty-First Amendment explicitly reserved to states the power to
set minimum drinking and alcohol possession requirements.198
Although the Court in Dole found that states reserved the power to
set the minimum drinking age in their respective jurisdictions, the
Court held that the Twenty-First Amendment did not bar Congress
from using its spending power to condition federal highway funds on
states setting the minimum drinking age at twenty-one.199 The
Court stated that “the constitutional limitations on Congress when
exercising its spending power are less exacting than those on its
authority to regulate directly.”200 In other words, although Congress
cannot directly regulate state minimum drinking age requirements,
it can achieve the objective indirectly through its spending pow-
er.201 Similarly, although it might be improper for Congress to
directly regulate states’ child marriage requirements, Congress can
still regulate child marriage under the spending power’s “less
exacting” standards.202
196. See id. at 210 (“[T]he [spending] power may not be used to induce the States to engage
in activities that would themselves be unconstitutional.”). 
197. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967) (“[T]he state court is no doubt correct in
asserting that marriage is a social relation subject to the State’s police power.”). 
198. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2 (“The transportation or importation into any State, Terri-
tory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in
violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.”). 
199. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 209. 
200. Id.; accord United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936). 
201. Dole, 483 U.S. at 209.
202. Id.
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Second, states could also argue that federal regulation of child
marriage laws would violate the Tenth Amendment;203 however, this
argument was clearly rejected in Dole.204 The Court “held that a
perceived Tenth Amendment limitation on congressional regulation
of state affairs did not concomitantly limit the range of conditions
legitimately placed on federal grants.”205 In other words, the Tenth
Amendment does not bar Congress from using federal funds to en-
courage states to enact certain requirements,206 such as minimum
child marriage standards. Therefore, the Tenth Amendment does
not prohibit Congress from utilizing its spending power to encour-
age states to enact uniform child marriage laws.
b. Fourteenth Amendment and Uniform Child Marriage
Laws 
The United States Supreme Court has historically recognized
marriage’s social value.207 In the 1967 landmark case Loving v.
Virginia, the Supreme Court recognized marriage as a fundamen-
tal right.208 The Loving Court invalidated a Virginia statute that
prohibited interracial marriage.209 In 2015, the Supreme Court
decided another landmark case, Obergefell v. Hodges, which extend-
ed the fundamental right to marry to same-sex couples.210
203. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people.”). 
204. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 210. 
205. Id.
206. See Oklahoma v. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 330 U.S. 127, 143 (1947) (“While the United
States is not concerned with, and has no power to regulate, local political activities as such
of state officials, it does have power to fix the terms upon which its money allotments to states
shall be disbursed.”).
207. See, e.g., Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888) (describing marriage as “creating
the most important relation in life” and “as having more to do with morals and civilization of
a people than any other institution”).
208. See 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“Marriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’
fundamental to our very existence and survival.... To deny this fundamental freedom on so
unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied in these statutes ... is surely to
deprive all the State’s citizens of liberty without due process of law.” (citation omitted)).
209. Id. at 2, 12.
210. See 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015).
2368 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:2337
Because marriage is considered a fundamental right in the
United States, a child could argue that restricting child marriage
under any circumstances violates the child’s fundamental right to
marry under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Substantive Due Pro-
cess Clause.211 However, courts have continuously rejected these
challenges and upheld the constitutionality of child marriage
restrictions.212
In Moe v. Dinkins, the plaintiffs challenged a New York statute
requiring parental consent for children under the age of eighteen to
marry.213 The Court upheld the New York statute: “While it is true
that a child, because of his minority, is not beyond the protection of
the Constitution, the Court has recognized the State’s power to
make adjustments in the constitutional rights of minors.”214 The
Court also noted that marriage is a topic that, despite its funda-
mental importance, has been subject to regulations and limita-
tions.215 Here, the Court declined to subject the statute to strict
scrutiny—the standard that typically applies to state actions that
deprive individuals of fundamental rights—because the unique
position of minors and marriage under the law lends itself to a need
for regulations enacted for society’s general welfare.216 The Court ul-
timately applied rational basis scrutiny to conclude that the New
York statute was “rationally related to the State’s legitimate inter-
ests in mature decision-making with respect to marriage by minors
and preventing unstable marriages.”217
Challenging the validity of child marriage restrictions under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Substantive Due Process Clause would
also fail because the minimum age of marriageability requirement
is rationally related to the federal government’s interest in pre-
venting children from evading states’ child marriage require-
ments.218 The uniform child marriage restrictions are also rationally
related to the government’s interest in ensuring that children
continue to be educated, preventing unstable marriages, and
211. See Hamilton, supra note 28, at 1861-62. 
212. See, e.g., Moe v. Dinkins, 533 F. Supp. 623, 630-31 (S.D.N.Y 1981). 
213. Id. at 625. 
214. Id. at 628 (citation omitted). 
215. See id. at 629. 
216. See id. 
217. Id. at 630-31. 
218. See supra Part IV. 
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protecting young girls’ physical and mental well-being.219 In sum,
uniform restrictions on child marriage in the United States will not
violate a child’s constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
It is also possible that the parents of children who wish to marry
under the age of eighteen could challenge uniform minimum age of
marriageability requirements under the Fourteenth Amendment,
alleging that the restriction infringes on the “liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under
their control,”220 which is also a fundamental right.221 However, it is
well established that the state has the capacity to enact regulations
to ensure children’s well-being,222 and states have been regulating
child marriage since the colonial era.223
Finally, Maynard v. Hill sums up the government’s power to reg-
ulate child marriage despite the individual’s fundamental right to
marry:
Marriage, as creating the most important relation in life, as
having more to do with the morals and civilization of a people
than any other institution, has always been subject to the con-
trol of the legislature. That body prescribes the age at which
parties may contract to marry, the procedure or form essential
to constitute marriage, the duties and obligations it creates, its
effects upon the property rights of both, present and prospective,
and the acts which may constitute grounds for its dissolution.224
In sum, given the long history of government regulated marriage
laws, it is unlikely that a child or parent will prevail on a Four-
teenth Amendment Substantive Due Process challenge against Con-
gress using its spending power to encourage states to enact uniform
child marriage requirements.
219. See supra Part III. 
220. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
221. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (“[W]e have recognized the fundamental
right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their
children.”); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (“We have recognized on numerous
occasions that the relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected.”). 
222. See Hamilton, supra note 28, at 1862. 
223. See supra Part I.B. 
224. 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888). 
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c. First Amendment and Child Marriage
It is also possible that an individual could raise a First Amend-
ment Free Exercise of Religion challenge against the government
using its spending power to encourage uniform child marriage laws.
In fact, former New Jersey Governor Chris Christie stated that reli-
gion was a major concern when he decided to veto a 2017 New
Jersey bill that would have made New Jersey the first state to enact
a blanket ban on child marriage.225 Specifically, Governor Christie
commented that “[a]n exclusion without exception would violate the
cultures and traditions of some communities in New Jersey.”226 
However, the First Amendment Free Exercise of Religion Clause
does not bar Congress from using its spending power to encourage
states to enact uniform child marriage laws. First, as previously
noted, the Supreme Court has already held that “[m]arriage ... has
always been subject to the control of the legislature.”227
Second, the Court has held that laws that are (1) generally appli-
cable, and (2) neutral toward religion, are presumptively constitu-
tional and subject to rational basis scrutiny.228 In Employment
Division v. Smith, the Court articulated this present standard stat-
ing that “the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of
the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general
applicability.’”229
The Court already validated legislative restrictions on marriage
in Reynolds v. United States, despite First Amendment Freedom of
Religion challenges to state laws that criminalized polygamous mar-
riages.230 Like in Reynolds, it is well within the legislature’s spend-
ing power to regulate the age at which children can marry without
225. See Matt Friedman, Ban on Child Marriages Conditionally Vetoed by Christie,
POLITICO (May 11, 2017, 1:13 PM), https://www.politico.com/states/new-
jersey/story/2017/05/11/ban-on-child-marriages-conditionally-vetoed-by-christie-111987
[https://perma.cc/W5RZ-DCS6].
226. Michael Booth, Christie, Citing Religious Custom, Vetoes Under-18 Marriage Ban, N.J.
L.J. (May 12, 2017, 4:12 PM), https://www.law.com/njlawjournal/almID/
1202786075555/?slreturn=20171017160343 [https://perma.cc/D4LD-WJSC].
227. See Maynard, 125 U.S. at 205. 
228. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990). 
229. Id. (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring
in judgment)).
230. See 98 U.S. 145, 168 (1878).
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violating the Free Exercise Clause under the Smith standard.231
Here, the government is enacting a neutral law with the secular
purpose—to protect child welfare. The state marriage requirements
also apply to all children, irrespective of their religious beliefs.
Because uniform child marriage laws are both neutral towards reli-
gion and generally applicable, it would not violate the Free Exercise
Clause to enact such laws.
5. Conditioning Federal Education Funds on Child Marriage
Regulations Is Not Coercive
The final requirement articulated in Dole is that “the financial
inducement offered by Congress [cannot] be so coercive as to pass
the point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’”232 Thus, the
funds conditioned on a particular requirement cannot be such that
states realistically have no other choice than to abide by congressio-
nal demands.233 However, the Court has offered little guidance on
establishing a threshold to determine coerciveness. In Steward
Machine Co. v. Davis, the Court suggested that a funding condition
becomes coercive when a state accepts the funding “under the strain
of a persuasion equivalent to undue influence,” and that courts
should use common sense to make this determination.234 In Dole,
Congress conditioned 5 percent of federal highway funds on states
setting the drinking age at twenty-one, which the Court found too
minimal to consider coercive.235 In contrast, in National Federation
of Independent Business v. Sebelius, Congress had conditioned
states’ federal Medicaid funding—which represented approximately
10 percent of each state’s overall budget—on states expanding their
Medicaid programs to include all individuals with income below 133
percent of the poverty line.236 In that case, the Court determined
that this condition was too coercive to leave states with any real
choice, thus invalidating the condition.237
231. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 879.
232. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis,
301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).
233. See id.
234. See 301 U.S. at 589-90.
235. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211.
236. See 567 U.S. 519, 542 (2012). 
237. See id. at 581-82.
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Here, federal funding makes up approximately 8 percent of states’
total education budgets.238 In fact, the majority of funding for edu-
cation comes from state and local funding (approximately 92 percent
at the elementary and secondary level).239 Because federal education
funding makes up such a small percentage of overall education
spending, it is unlikely that the Court would find that withholding
10 percent of the otherwise available federal education funds coer-
cive. In contrast, in National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius, 50-83 percent of Medicaid funding came from the federal
government.240 Therefore, states relied heavily on federal funds to
sustain their Medicaid programs, and withholding federal funds
from the program left states with no choice other than to accept
Congress’s condition.241
Because States do not substantially rely on federal education
funds in the first place, withholding a mere 10 percent of otherwise
available federal education funds is not so coercive as to leave states
with no real choice other than to set the minimum age of marriage-
ability at eighteen, without exception. States are still free to enact
their own child marriage law requirements and forfeit a mere 0.8
percent of their overall education budget.
VI. WHY THE TAXING POWER IS INSUFFICIENT TO ADDRESS CHILD
MARRIAGE
An alternative to Congress using its spending power is Congress
using its taxing power to disincentivize child marriage. However,
this Part argues that the taxing power is an ineffective mechanism
for preventing child marriage and would leave too much state varia-
tion to effectively prevent child marriage.
The Constitution gives Congress the power to “lay and collect
[t]axes.”242 The Supreme Court has interpreted this provision as
granting Congress broad power to tax in order to raise revenue.243
238. The Federal Role in Education, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., https://www2.ed.gov/about/
overview/fed/role.html [https://perma.cc/V78G-ZH8F] (last modified May 25, 2017). 
239. Id. 
240. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 682 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
241. See id. at 581-82 (majority opinion).
242. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1. 
243. Cf. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 564 (noting that an “essential feature of any tax” is that “[i]t
produces at least some revenue for the Government”).
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However, Congress can only use its taxing power to raise revenue,
and cannot impose a penalty through the taxing power.244 However,
the incidental purpose of influencing conduct will not invalidate
Congressional taxation.245 Therefore, Congress could enact a tax on
marriage licenses for children marrying under the age of eighteen,
as long as the tax was not so high as to qualify as a penalty. In this
context, the taxing power would be insufficient to prevent child mar-
riage. The current system of states setting the minimum age of
marriageability is problematic because lack of uniformity allows
children to evade strict marriage laws.246 The taxing power would
not address this issue, because the power does not allow Congress
to encourage uniform laws; rather, the taxing power simply creates
a monetary disincentive for early child marriage.247 Although this
disincentive might prevent a handful of child marriages, it is un-
likely that it will prevent forced child marriages or marriages en-
tered into because of strong religious beliefs. Children under the age
of eighteen would still be allowed to marry, but the child or parent
would have to pay a tax to do so. This practice would not protect
children from early child marriage’s harmful consequences, and
would not be an effective method to prevent child marriage.
CONCLUSION
After enduring years of horrific sexual and physical abuse at the
hands of her adult husband, Sherry Johnson escaped her abusive
marriage.248 Now, Ms. Johnson is working with the Florida legisla-
ture to pass an absolute ban on child marriage to protect children
in her home state of Florida.249
Despite success stories such as Ms. Johnson’s, child marriage con-
tinues to plague the United States and creates devastating, lifelong
consequences for children. Although some states have taken action
244. In Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., the Court invalidated Congress’s implementation
of a tax on companies that did not comply with child labor standards. 259 U.S. 20, 34, 44
(1922). In that case, the Court found Congress crossed the line from raising revenue and was
instead imposing a penalty. Id. at 39, 44.
245. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 537.
246. See supra Part VI.
247. See supra note 244 and accompanying text; cf. Sebelius, 567 U.S at 585. 
248. Basu, supra note 1. 
249. Id. 
2374 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:2337
to slow this devastating trend, a lack of uniformity among state
laws frustrates their efforts. Therefore, national uniformity in state
marriage laws is necessary to protect the welfare of future genera-
tions. To achieve this national uniformity, Congress must condition
10 percent of states’ federal education funds on enacting statutes
setting the minimum age of marriageability at eighteen, with no ex-
ceptions. As previously discussed, this requirement is well within
the parameters that the Supreme Court established in South
Dakota v. Dole: (1) child marriage laws are for children’s and so-
ciety’s general welfare, (2) the requirement is unambiguous,
(3) there is a close nexus between lower educational attainment and
child marriage’s negative effects, (4) there are no independent
constitutional bars to the condition, and (5) the financial incentive
is not so coercive as to invalidate the requirement.250 Therefore,
Congress should use its spending power to achieve uniformity
among state child marriage laws. Only after the United States has
achieved uniformity in child marriage laws will it be able to protect
children from child marriage’s horrific consequences and increase
society’s well-being.
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